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WEINBERGER v. WIESENFELD: EQUAL
PROTECTION AND SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
IN GOVERNMENT BENEFIT PROGRAMS

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld'
has positive implications for the developing application of equal protection criteria to sex discrimination. First, it clearly establishes that
the Burger Court, despite its refusal to declare sex a suspect classification, will apply a relatively high level of scrutiny in cases involving
claims of sex discrimination. Second, it confirms the inference to be
drawn from other recent cases that the Court is inclined to give a
favorable reception to constitutional attacks on sex-based classifications in government benefit programs.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
In the Wiesenfeld decision, the Supreme Court closely analyzed
the legislative ends behind certain sections of the Social Security Act
and the statutory means that were used to achieve those ends. Having
found that a sex-based classification in the Act had no rational relationship to the legislative ends, the Court held unconstitutional the
provision of the Social Security Act that grants mother's benefits to
the widow of a deceased wage earner with a dependent child, but
that grants no corresponding father's benefits to the widower of a
deceased wage earner with a dependent child.
Looking at the decisions of the first term in which all four of the
Nixon-appointed Justices participated, Professor Gunther presciently
forecast several years ago what direction the new Court's equal protection decisions would take.' Given the shift toward conservatism
in the membership of the Court, Gunther reasoned that some middle
ground would be found between following the Warren Court's policy
of vigorous expansion of equal protection doctrines and returning to
the discredited permissive standard of the "old" equal protection.
The Warren Court's "two-tier" standard had become so rigid that
"suspect classification" and "minimum rational basis" had
become
mere conclusory labels rather than tests. Analyzing the equal protection decisions of the 1971 Term, Gunther concluded,
1. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (Supp. II, 1972).
3. Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).

NEW MEXICO LA WREVIEW

(Vol. 5

The model suggested by recent developments would view equal
protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground
of decision in a broad range of cases. Stated most simply, it would
have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has
never been formally abandoned: that legislative'means must substantially further legislative ends. . . . The yardstick for the acceptability
of the means would be the purposes chosen by the legislatures, not
"constitutional" interests drawn from the value perceptions of the
Justices.
The case that caused Gunther the most difficulty was Reed v.
Reed,5 which invalidated an Idaho statute giving preference to men
over similarly-sitated women as administrators of estates, on the
6
The State's argument
ground that the sex criterion was "arbitrary."
that the classification had a reasonable purpose of reducing administrative disputes would have stood up under previous applications of
the requirement that a classification bear a rational relationship to
the State's interest. Justice Burger's opinion eschewed the established
rational basis-suspect classification dichotomy, but it also avoided
enunciating any new or intermediate standard of review. With apparent perplexity, Gunther concluded,
Only by importing some special suspicion of sex-related means from
the new [Warren Court] equal protection area can the result be
made entirely persuasive. Yet application of the new equal protec7
tion criteria is precisely what Reed v. Reed purported to avoid.
Despite the fact that Gunther found his crystal ball a bit misty, his
prognostications turned out to be highly accurate. The Burger Court
has worked toward an intermediate, means-focused level of scrutiny
in equal protection cases, and-with some lapses-it has shown a
considerable degree of suspicion of sex-related classifications.
In 1973, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.' In that case, the Tenth Circuit had
found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds a provision of
9
the Internal Revenue Code that allowed a deduction for the care of
dependents to all women, but only to those men who were widowers
or husbands whose wives were incapacitated. A single man whose
invalid mother was dependent on him challenged the classification in
4. Id. at 20, 21.
5. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
6. Id. at 76.
7. Gunther, supra note 2, at 34.
8. Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466, 470 (1972); cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906
(1973).
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214, 26 U.S.C. § 214 (1970), as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 214
(Supp. I, 1971).
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the statute. The Tenth Circuit discreetly cited Reed to the effect that
the classification was "subject to scrutiny" (without specifying the
level of scrutiny) and found that other means were available to
achieve the legislative purpose without using "invidious discrimination based solely on sex." ' 0 The Supreme Court was not persuaded
to grant certiorari by the Commissioner's argument that women's
lesser earning power and traditional role in the home made it reasonable to use a classification that favored all women over single men. 1'
Frontiero v. Richardson, also in 1973, denounced sex discrimination as "romantic paternalism" which "put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." ' 2 The Court found unconstitutional statutes1 3
allowing a male member of the armed forces to claim his wife as a
dependent, whether or not she actually depended on him for support, while requiring a servicewoman to prove that her husband was
dependent on her for over one-half of his support before she might
claim him as a dependent. When a spouse was classed as dependent,
the couple received increased quarters allowances and the spouse
received medical and dental benefits. 1 4
The Court's eight-to-one vote indicated that there was strong support for striking down a sex-based classification whose only justification was administrative convenience. The theoretical basis for the
holding, however, is unclear. A four-justice plurality declared sex a
suspect classification; yet Justice Brennan's opinion for the plurality
seems to hint that the sex-based classification might withstand even
the strict scrutiny applied to a suspect classification if the Government could show that use of the classification actually saved the
Government any money:
[T] he Government argues that Congress might reasonably have concluded that it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively
to presume that wives of male members are financially dependent
upon their husbands, while burdening female members with the task
of establishing dependency in fact.
The Government offers no concrete evidence, however, tending to
support its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the
Government any money. In order to satisfy the demands of strict
judicial scrutiny, the Government must demonstrate, for example,
10. 469 F.2d at 470.
11. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8-9, Commissioner v. Moritz, 412 U.S. 906 (1973);
quoted in Davidson, Ginsburg, & Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination 54 (1974).
12. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
13. 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), as amended, 37 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. III, 1973); 10 U.S.C.

§ 1072 (1970).

14. 37 U.S.C. § 403 (1970), as amended, 37 U.S.C. § 403 (Supp. 1, 1970); 10 U.S.C.

§ 1076 (1970).
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that it is actually cheaper to grant increased benefits with respect to

all male members, than it is to determine which male members are in
fact entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits only to
those members whose wives actually meet the dependency requirement. Here, however, there is substantial evidence that, if put to the
test, many of the wives of male members would fail to qualify for
benefits. 15

Justice Stewart's one-sentence concurring opinion enigmatically cited
Reed v. Reed. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment but cited the pendency
of the Equal Rights Amendment as his reason for not subscribing to
a classification of sex as suspect.
The decisions of Kahn v. Shevin in 1974 and Schlesinger v. Ballard
early in 1975 temporarily weakened expectations that the Court was
moving toward a fairly stringent application of the rational basis test
to sex classifications. In his majority opinion in Kahn v. Shevin,' 6
Justice Douglas seemed to lapse into the "romantic paternalism" he
had joined in denouncing in Frontiero, by upholding a Florida law
granting a property tax exemption to widows but not to widowers
on the ground that it compensated for the heavier burden of spousal
laws on women. The three Justices (Brennan, Marshall, and White)
who had joined Justice Douglas in the plurality opinion in Frontiero
disagreed with him in this case. In two dissenting opinions they
objected to the standard of review, pointing out that the law was
overinclusive by including all women and underinclusive by excluding all needy men.
In Schlesinger v. Ballard,' ' the Court again found a sufficiently
rational and benign purpose in a sex-based classification to meet an
equal protection challenge. In response to a male naval officer's complaint that women officers were given four years longer than men to
achieve promotion or receive a mandatory discharge, Justice
Stewart's majority opinion held that the classification was reasonable
in view of women's lesser opportunity to achieve promotion through
combat and sea duty. The sex classifications in Reed and Frontiero
were distinguished as being based on "archaic and overbroad generalto equalize
izations,"' '8 while the classification in Ballard served
9 who had wanted
justices'
four
The
opportunity between the sexes.
to adopt sex as a suspect classification in Frontiero, and who had
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

411 U.S. at 689 (footnote omitted).
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
Id. at 577.
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White.
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divided in Kahn v. Shevin, joined forces again as dissenters in Ballard.
They found no sufficient governmental interest served by the statutory classification and pointed out that the Court has "recently
declined to manufacture justifications in order to save an apparently

invalid statutory classification."'2
After Kahn v. Shevin and Ballard, the equal protection waters
were rather muddy. But one analyst argued that Reed and Frontiero
would retain their importance and that, in Ballard,
the majority's insistence that Congress had in fact squarely faced the
sex-discrimination issue and explicitly chose to differentiate between
the sexes only to achieve specific ends not related to sex discrimination holds out the possibility that similar efforts may be demanded
of all legislative sex discrimination before it may pass constitutional
muster.2

This optimistic conclusion was justified within a few weeks when

the decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld was announced.

2

With no

dissenters, the Court found it a denial of equal protection to make
sex the sole determinant of whether a widowed spouse of a wage

earner receives social security benefits while caring for a dependent

child. Justice Brennan's opinion avoided the theoretical wrangling

about standards of review that characterized Frontiero. No attempt
was made to commit the Court to treat sex as a suspect classification,
but the opinion makes it clear that a highly rational connection

between legitimate legislative ends and statutory means will have to
be shown in order for a sex-based classification to withstand an equal
protection challenge. 3
Comparing the failure to provide widower's benefits in this case to
the dependency test for husbands in Frontiero, the Court reasoned:
20. 95 S. Ct. at 584.
21. Krattenmaker, Sex Not Suspect: Sub Silentio, 1 Women L. Rep. 1.155, 1.156
(1975).
22. March 19, 1975, two months after Ballard.
23. It is highly instructive to compare the Supreme Court's Wiesenfeld opinion to the
opinion of the three-judge Federal District Court that first heard the case. The District
Court adheres strictly to the two-tier equal protection analysis. It finds that the statutory
classification in the Social Security Act is sufficiently reasonable to meet the minimum
rational basis test, but it decides that sex is a suspect classification (citing Frontiero) and
invalidates the statutory provision on a strict scrutiny test. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of
Health, Education & Welfare, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973). Justice Brennan's complete
disregard for the District Court's two-tier analysis, precisely the type of analysis he himself
had employed in Frontiero, seems to indicate that he has joined the Court's trend toward
applying an intermediate level of scrutiny in sex-discrimination cases. The other justices who
argued for "suspect classification-strict scrutiny" in Frontiero subscribed to Justice
Brennan's opinion in Wiesenfeld (with the exception of Justice Douglas, who did not participate in the Wiesenfeld decision).
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Section 402(g) clearly operates, as did the statutes invalidated by
our judgment in Frontiero, to deprive women of protection for their

Indeed,
families which men receive as a result of their employment.
24
pernicious.
more
the classification here is in some ways

This classification was more pernicious because Stephen Wiesenfeld

was not even allowed to try to prove that he was dependent on his
wife, as Joseph Frontiero had been; and because Paula Wiesenfeld
had paid social security taxes on her salary whereas Sharron
Frontiero had paid no tax for the benefits she demanded.
The Court analyzed the legislative purpose behind Section 402(g)
and the rationality of the statute for carrying out that purpose. From
an analysis of legislative history and the statutory scheme of the
Social Security Act, the Court concluded that Section 402(g) was
not part of a comprehensive plan to compensate women in general
for economic discrimination, since many classes of women were in2
To the Government's argueligible for social security benefits.
ments that the sex-based classification in 402(g) was part of a benign,
compensatory scheme, the Court replied tartly,
the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an
automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying a statutory scheme. . . . This Court need not in
equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative

purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its
not have been
history demonstrates that
2 the asserted purpose could
a goal of the legislation. 6
The purpose behind Section 402(g), the Court concluded, was "to
provide children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the
personal attention of the other ...

"2 '7

If the parent chose to stay at

home and care for the child, the parent received a living allowance. If
he or she chose to go to work, the Section 402 allowance was reduced one dollar for every two dollars earned above $2,400 annually. 2 8 Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent to stay
at home with the child, the sex-based classification of Section 402(g)
was "entirely irrational" 2 9 and the classification had to fall.
24. 95 S. Ct. at 1232.
25. See Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 Hastings L. J.
277, 278 (1971), for an account of the "blackout period" when a housewife is ineligible for
any government benefits between the time her last dependent child leaves home and age
sixty-two (sixty for widows).
26. 95 S. Ct. at 1233. This pronouncement seems to be a virtual renunciation of the old,
permissive "minimum rational basis" test in the equal protection area.
27. Id.
28. 95 S. Ct. at 1229; 42 U.S.C. § 403(b) & (f) (1970).
29. 95 S. Ct. at 1235.
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Although Kahn v. Shevin and Schlesinger v. Ballard indicate that
the Supreme Court will not uniformly strike down statutory classifications based on sex as violations of equal protection, the level of
scrutiny accorded to such classifications in recent years has been

relatively strict. Looking at Moritz (tax deductions), Frontiero (military dependent's benefits), and Wiesenfeld (social security benefits),
one can infer that any government benefit which is awarded on the
basis of classification by sex is now vulnerable to constitutional

attack.
THE IMPACT OF WIESENFELD

As one of the attorneys for Stephen Wiesenfeld described the
decision,
The Wiesenfeld opinion is a clear statement that the Court will no
longer accept at face value, as an automatic shield for discrimination,
recitation of woman-protective purposes for laws that associate
women 0 with the hearth, men with the wide world outside the
3
home.

Indeed, the opinion contains a passage that, taken in isolation, seems
scarcely less than an equal rights amendment to the Social Security
Act:
Since the Constitution forbids the gender-based differentiation
premised upon assumptions as to dependency made in the statutes
before us in Frontiero, the Constitution also forbids the genderbased differentiation that results in the efforts of women workers
required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for
3
their families than is produced by the efforts of men. 1
The provision of the Social Security Act that was found unconstitutional in Wiesenfeld is only one of many in the Act that attributes
benefits in an inequitable fashion based on sex classifications.
Women are the chief victims of these inequities, but men too are
deprived of benefits, as the Wiesenfeld case illustrates. The reason the
Social Security Act treats men and women so differently is not far to
seek, as former Congresswoman Martha Griffiths points out:
The income security programs of this nation were designed for a
land of male and female stereotypes, a land where all men were
breadwinners and all women were wives or widows; where men provided necessary income for their families but women did not; in
30. American Civil Liberties Union, Memorandum (Mar. 1975) (prepared by Ruth Bader
Ginsberg).

31. 95 S. Ct. at 1232.
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other words, where all of the men supported all of the women. This
view of the world never matched reality, but today it is further than
ever from the truth. 3 2

The percentage of women in the labor force has doubled in the
last half-century, from 20 percent of all workers in 192013 to 39
percent in 1973;34 and the percentage of married women who work
nearly tripled from 1940 (14%) to 1970 (40%) . 3 The women who
work do so to a great extent because their earnings are needed:
Millions of women who were in the labor force in March 1973
worked to support themselves or others. This was true of most of
the 7.7 million single women workers. Nearly all of the 6.3 million
women workers who were widowed, divorced or separated from
their husbands-particularly the women who were also raising chil-

dren-were working for compelling economic reasons. In addition,
the 3.7 million married women workers whose husbands had incomes below $5,000 in 1972 almost certainly worked because of
economic need. Finally, about 3 million women would be added if
we take into account those women whose husbands had incomes
between $5,000 and $7,000.36
Because women's average earnings are far less than those of
men,3 it is of special concern to women that their social security
benefits be computed on the most equitable basis possible. Every
worker, of course, male or female, has an interest in seeing that his or
her contributions to social security result in the best possible range
of benefits for the worker and his or her dependents. In looking at
the benefits of married couples, it is often difficult to say which
spouse is being deprived because the presumption of a wife's dependency causes her benefits to be defined or computed on a different
basis from those of her husband. Under the provision challenged in
Wiesenfeld, the wife lost because she paid social security taxes that
did not obtain the same amount of benefits for her surviving dependents as a man's contributions would have; and the husband lost
because he was not allowed to collect benefits in a situation where a
similarly situated woman would have been able to collect.
Although wives are penalized in certain ways by the presumption
32. Griffiths, Sex Discriminationin Income Security Programs, 49 Notre Dame Lawyer
534 (1974).
33. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women Workers Today 6 (1971).
34. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Highlights of Women's Employment and
Education: Employment in 1973 1 (1974).
35. Research and Statistics Note, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Wife's
Earnings as a Source of Family Income 1 (April 30, 1974).
36. Women's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Why Women Work 2 (1974).
37. Research and Statistics Note, supra note 35, at 6.

May 1975]

WEINBERGER V WIESENFELD

that they are dependent on their husbands, men may be penalized by
the presumption that they are not dependent on their wives: in order
to qualify for benefits on his wife's wage record, a husband or
widower must prove that he received over one-half of his individual
support from the wife. 3 8 This dependency requirement is exactly
like the requirement struck down in Frontiero,3 9 hence, the social
security requirement is open to constitutional attack.4 0 One must
keep in mind, however, the implication in Justice Brennan's Frontiero opinion that a sex-based classification might survive even if the
strict scrutiny accorded to a suspect classification if it could be
shown that employing the classification would save the Government
money. 4 It was not expected that many widowed fathers of dependent children would qualify for benefits under the provision at issue
in Wiesenfeld;4 2 therefore it is not yet clear how heavily the Court
would weigh major costs to the social security system against a constitutional challenge to sex classifications in the benefit structure.
Divorced husbands and wives both have grounds to attack the
classifications used in the social security structure, but for different
reasons. Divorced husbands have no entitlement whatever to benefits
derived from their former wives' earnings, even if they could meet
the one-half support requirement for dependent husbands and
widowers discussed above. Divorced wives and surviving divorced
wives, on the other hand, need not show any degree of dependency
on their former husbands' past or present earnings, but they cannot
collect dependents' benefits unless they were married for at least 20
years before divorcing.4 A surviving divorced wife who is the
mother of the covered employee's child comes in yet another category: no matter how long she was married or to what extent she or
her child was dependent on the employee, she is entitled to benefits
based on her deceased former husband's earnings.4 4 All of these
categories are clearly based on stereotypical ideas, "archaic and overbroad generalizations" that are as constitutionally infirm as the generalization behind the provision challenged in Wiesenfeld.
38. 42 U.S.C. § § 402(c)(1)(C), (f)(1)(D) (1970).
39. Note, Sex Classificationsin the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 Ind. L. J. 181,
193 (1973).
40. Id. at 193. Disabled widowers (in contrast to disabled widows) must also prove
dependence in order to receive benefits based on their wives' earnings. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)
(Supp. II, 1972).
41. 411 U.S. at 689. The passage from the Frontiero opinion referred to is quoted in the
text accompanying note 15, supra.
42. 95 S. Ct. at 1236.
43. 42 U.S.C. § § 402(b) & (e), 416(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
44. 42 U.S.C. § § 402(g), 416(d)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
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Computation of benefits for families where both spouses are wage
earners is highly inequitable, as Representative Griffiths explains:
the social security tax imposes an inequitably heavy burden on
families with two earners. A retired couple where both husband and
wife have worked may receive less in benefits than a single-earner
family which had the same total earnings and paid no more in social
...

security taxes. . . . Moreover, a retired couple where both husband

and wife have worked may have paid more in social security taxes
and yet receive less in benefits than a single-earner family which had
lower earnings.4 s
This anomaly in benefits, like that challenged in Wiesenfeld, results from classifications in the social security benefit structure that
have the effect of depriving working wives of an equitable return for
the contributions they make.
Congress has made many amendments to the Social Security Act
since its creation in 1939, and most of them have served to amelio-

rate inequities even more severe than those which exist today. There
are bills before the 94th Congress to deal with some of the problems
discussed here, 4 6 but the prevailing climate of concern over the
future solvency of the Social Security system 4

7

makes it unlikely

that Congress will take the initiative to remove any of the sex-based
inequities from the Act in the near future. The decision in Wiesenfeld, then, with Reed and Frontierobehind it, implies that the courts
may offer the best hope of dealing with the equal protection problems posed by social security and other government benefit pro-

grams.
MARCIA BROWN HUACO

45. Griffiths, supra note 32, at 537.
46. Among the Social Security reforms proposed in bills before Congress in 1975 were
payment of benefits to a married couple on their combined earnings record; eliminating the
special dependency requirement for entitlement to husband's or widower's benefits; providing for payment of benefits to widowed fathers with minor children; and reducing from
20 to 5 years the length of time a divorced woman's marriage to an insured individual must
have lasted in order for her to qualify for wife's or widow's benefits on his wage record.
H.R. 156, 775, 901, 1938, 1948, 2012, 2529, 4357, 4359, 4501, 4565 & S.277, 278, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
Many of these reforms have been proposed repeatedly in the past (notably by former
Rep. Martha Griffiths and by Rep. Bella Abzug) and have failed to pass.
47. See Social Security: Trouble Ahead, Newsweek 75 (Mar. 24, 1974); Social Security:
Financial Woes Ahead, Albuquerque Journal, Apr. 6, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 1; Samuelson,
Social Security: A-OK, Newsweek 74 (Apr. 14, 1975).

